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ABSTRACT 
Although never rigorously tested, it has become a sort of accepted wisdom amongst social scientists 
that government decentralization offers key advantages for innovators. Decentralized governments 
are widely seen as agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation’s gale of creative 
destruction. Meanwhile, centralized states, even when democratic, have come to be viewed as rigid 
and thus hostile to the risks, costs, and change associated with new technology; or are subject to 
capture by status-quo interest groups which use their influence to promote policies which ultimately 
restrict technological change. Therefore decentralized government is often perceived as a necessary 
institutional foundation for encouraging long-run technological innovation. In the following article, 
this wisdom is tested using data on international patent activity, scientific publications, and high-
technology exports. The results suggest that the supposed technological advantages of decentralized 
states are a fiction, and that international pressures may be more important. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Research Summary 
Why are some countries more technologically innovative than others? Technological 
innovation is a vital component of every state’s long-run economic growth, international 
comparative advantage, and relative military power. In recognition of this, almost every society 
expends a considerable share of its resources on the pursuit of technological advance. However, 
despite the random nature of innovation, and the seemingly clear requirements for promoting 
innovative behavior, some countries are consistently more successful than others at technological 
progress, even amongst the industrialized democracies.  
 When observed over the long-run, one apparent trend is the ability of decentralized states to 
maintain their places at the technological frontier. Decentralized governments are widely seen as 
agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation’s gale of creative destruction. 
Meanwhile centralized states, even when democratic, seem either unable to achieve high rates of 
innovation or to maintain technological leadership if achieved. Over time this observation has 
evolved into conventional wisdom: centralized organizations of all sizes, from firms to nation-
states, have come to be viewed as rigid and thus either hostile to the risks, costs, and change 
associated with new technology, or prone to cling too long to fool-hearty or outdated technological 
projects.1 These sentiments can be found both in the popular press2 and throughout the academic 
literature. In the latter, a number of prominent economists and political scientists have applied 
various forms of the political decentralization hypothesis to explain differences in national 
innovation rates. These efforts include works by Nathan Rosenberg & L.E. Birdzell Jr., Joel Mokyr, 
Daron Acemoglu, and Daniel Drezner; or can be inferred from the writings of scholars in 
evolutionary economics such as Richard Nelson, Sydney Winter, and Walter Vincenti (citations 
below).  
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This article therefore asks a simple empirical question: is there any aggregate evidence for a 
general relationship between government structure and long-run technological innovation? Despite 
broad theoretical support, a correlation between political decentralization and technological 
innovation has yet to be rigorously established by social scientists. While the popular association 
between the two phenomena is strong, the empirical evidence consists entirely of anecdotal 
observations and stylized case studies. In an attempt to answer this question, this paper examines 
several datasets of international patent activity, science and engineering research publications, and 
high-technology exports. Using a variety of different statistical approaches and controls, it will be 
shown that no matter how one treats the data, little evidence can be produced to support the 
decentralization-innovation hypothesis: innovators in decentralized states are empirically no more 
technologically innovative than those in more centralized states. The conventional wisdom is 
therefore in need of deep revision, and indications of more fruitful avenues of research will be 
inferred from the data. Thus this paper reports a negative finding; but it is one of such strong and 
consistent disconfirming evidence for a relationship so relatively well accepted, that it merits entry 
into the scientific debate over national innovation rates. 
 
 
1.2. Justification 
This question of whether decentralized states are more technologically innovative than 
others should interest scholars of comparative politics and international relations for reasons beyond 
that of national technological capability. First and foremost, political power is currently in the 
process of being redistributed throughout states around the world, not only via a global shift 
towards greater democracy, but with traditionally centralized polities in Asia, the Americas, and 
Europe either now decentralized or on their way to decentralization. And even while the European 
Union’s members are engaged in a process of agglomeration in order to reap the benefits of size and 
the economies of scale, there is also a concurrent commitment in Europe to decentralizing their 
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massive new political organization. While the politics of local autonomy and ethno-cultural 
divisions certainly play a role in the move to decentralize government in some states, part of the 
motivation behind this global movement is also this belief that decentralized states have a long-run 
competitive advantage over centralized states in promoting technological progress and in sustaining 
innovation-driven economic growth.3  
Second, scholars of federalism also have an obvious interest in the outcome of this debate, 
especially since the theoretical consensus on the macroeconomic effects of federalism has recently 
broken down. A long tradition of federalism research credits decentralized political systems with 
everything from fiscal restraint to efficient government to preserving markets.4 But more recently, a 
critical line of research has attacked this view and pointed out the detrimental affects of federalism 
on fiscal & monetary policy, exchange rate management, and privatization programs.5 In an attempt 
at synthesis, still other scholars have criticized this dichotomy as a fallacy based upon abstract 
models and individual case studies. Instead, they use empirical data to show that federalism and its 
effects are better understood as varying along a spectrum.6 Since most of these arguments concern 
the consequences of decentralization for long-run macroeconomic management and performance, 
and since technological innovation is both affected by, and is an important component of, the 
macroeconomy, it makes sense to link these research programs. That is, it is logical to ask whether 
the macroeconomic benefits, or costs, of decentralization identified by federalism scholars also 
affect technological innovation. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Framework  
 
2.1 Definition 
Political decentralization (a.k.a. government decentralization) is defined here as an increase 
in both the number and equality of centers of political power and policy-making. For many scholars, 
“decentralization” simply means federalism. However, as will be shown below, existing theories 
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about government structure and technological change demand that I be more flexible in my 
definition, and allow decentralization to be either vertical or horizontal. In vertically decentralized 
states, authority has been shifted away from the central government and towards local governments, 
the classic example being federalism.7 In horizontally decentralized states, authority is shared 
between an executive, legislature, judiciary, and in some cases even a powerful bureaucracy or 
autonomous military.8 In practice, many states decentralize even further, with power formally 
divided between different houses of the legislature, competing bureaucracies, or branches of the 
armed forces. Finally, as will be further discussed below, when measuring the degree of 
decentralization it is also important to consider that government structure can have both formal de 
jure components (those expressed in law or constitution) and informal de facto components (e.g. the 
extent of party alignment across different branches of government, or the extent of preference 
heterogeneity within each legislative branch).  
 
2.2 Theory 
Decentralization proponents emphasize four primary mechanisms by which government 
structure should affect national innovation rates. First, they argue that both horizontal and vertical 
decentralization increase the number of political and economic units participating in, funding, and 
demanding innovative activities. This not only multiplies technological search and experimentation 
efforts,9 but can also increase the diversity of these research efforts and the scientific-technical 
knowledge acquired through them.10  
Second, scholars assert that, by increasing the number of units, decentralization increases 
competition, thus increasing the incentives for innovation. This theme recurs throughout much of 
the innovation literature, but is perhaps best specified in the federalism literature. Federalism 
scholars points out that decentralization can result in a “Delaware effect” in which sub-national 
governments compete with one another to attract business investment, and therefore constantly 
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improve the legal, tax, and regulatory environments for innovators.11 This concept has evolved into 
Weingast’s “market-preserving federalism”, in which federalism can prevent government from 
acting in a predatory manner towards innovators, and allow credible commitments to produce pro-
market policies and public goods.12  
Third, it is also argued that decentralization provides superior information for both 
policymakers and innovators.13 Hayek observed that much information which is helpful for 
economic activity cannot be usefully centralized (e.g. tacit knowledge).14 Although Hayek wrote 
about the merits of decentralized markets over central economic planning, the implications for 
political decentralization are clear: local policymakers simply have superior information about local 
conditions than do distant national legislators or bureaucrats, and can therefore design better policy 
for the local environment. And better policy should mean more efficient allocation of resources 
towards, and proper incentives for, local innovators. This does not mean that centralized political 
coordination of any kind is always bad for technological innovation; but as Tiebout has shown, 
decentralized local public goods production is generally better at reflecting popular preferences than 
is centralized national public goods production.15 Hence in Tiebout’s economy, different sub-
national governments provide a menu of different policy environments, which allows different 
kinds of “consumer-voters” of public goods (here innovators consuming scientific knowledge, 
investors looking for R&D opportunities, high-tech labor seeking employment, etc.) to choose the 
environment that’s right for them. So, for example, innovators in Massachusetts can use state 
government funding to pursue stem cell research, while Kansas’ more rural and religious taxpayers 
can instead fund initiatives in agricultural sciences, and California’s public universities can focus on 
alternative energy. In a unitary state, this type of public goods preference matching would not occur 
as systematically. Surowecki describes this as a form of decentralization-driven specialization 
which makes innovators more productive and efficient.16
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Fourth, several scholars argue that political decentralization aids national innovation rates by 
making the state less vulnerable to capture by status-quo interest groups.17 Put simply, more 
centralized governments are more vulnerable to interest-group capture because they have fewer 
decision-making points and veto-players to control. Therefore, ceteris paribus, more capture-able 
centralized governments are more likely to make policies which slow technological innovation.18 
And once made, such policies will be imposed across the entire nation due to the centralized nature 
of government in these states. But in decentralized states, even if similar policies arise, they can be 
reversed or overridden by sub-national governments. A good example of this in the US might be 
AIDS research during the 1980s when powerful interest groups exerted their influence on the 
federal executive branch to slow innovation in these areas. However, the federal legislature, as well 
as state and city governments, were able to override the objections of the executive branch and 
provide regulatory or budgetary support for research; while the courts served as an additional point 
of entry for supporters of technological progress.19  
This fourth mechanism might also help to explain why other institutional explanations have 
failed to generalize across different countries and time periods. For example, national systems of 
innovation (NSI) scholars have long probed the effects of dozens of national institutions and 
policies on the innovation rates of a wide spectrum of nations, but with few generalizeable results.20 
NSI’s approach has been to use case-studies to identify the domestic institutions and policies which 
best solve the extraordinary public goods problems associated with technological innovation.21 NSI 
scholars have therefore examined the interactions and effects on innovation rates of different 
education policies, science policies, trade regimes, legal frameworks, financial institutions, anti-
trust laws, etc.  However after almost twenty years of research, NSI scholars have failed to produce 
any general theory of national innovation rates. That is, institution or policy “X” might explain a 
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certain country’s innovation rate at a specific point in time, but not over time and not in other 
countries.  
Government decentralization offers a possible explanation for this conundrum. According to 
decentralization proponents, technological innovation poses not just a public goods dilemma, it also 
suffers from an interest-group capture problem. Status-quo interest groups are those whose assets 
(skills, capital, land, etc.) are hurt by technological change. And in order to obstruct threatening 
technological changes, these interest groups will often seek to influence or capture precisely those 
institutions and policies which NSI scholars use to explain innovation rates. Even the presence of 
markets cannot prevent this phenomena, argue Acemoglu et. al. and Drezner, since markets and 
property rights are but institutions subject to the will of captured state apparatus.22 Thus NSI 
explanations fail to generalize across time and space because the mid-level institutions & policies 
they prescribe are endogenous to government structure: their technological goals, and their 
efficiency in achieving these goals, are determined by the ability of broader state structures to resist 
interest-group capture.  
What if a centralized government is strongly pro-technology or captured by pro-technology 
interest-groups? After all, centralized government can better solve coordination dilemmas that 
inhibit technological progress, and marshal the economic resources necessary for massive projects 
such as late-industrialization, space flight, or atomic weaponry. Therefore more centralized 
government should be good for innovation when powerful interest-groups favor it. Yet Drezner 
points out that, even in these cases, decentralized states still have an advantage because the sub-
national provinces can act as experimental test beds for different kinds of policies and 
innovations.23 And over time, the vulnerability of centralized states to interest-group capture will 
outweigh any benefits, as new innovations rapidly evolve into status-quo interests and thus a drag 
on further technological progress. 
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Finally, the arguments posited above should be qualified in that scholars differ in the degree 
to which they believe political decentralization matters, relative to other causal variables, for 
innovation. At one extreme, evolutionary economics suggests the possibility that, at least in the 
long-run, government decentralization alone might do much of the work towards fostering 
innovation. In evolutionary theory, variation (i.e. search efforts) and selection (i.e. competition for 
limited resources) are necessary and sufficient for sustained technological change.24 And since 
decentralization is both necessary for competition and fosters variation, in the very long-run it could 
be a primary causal factor for technological change. Granted, evolutionary economists generally 
theorize about firms fostering innovation within an industry, but there is no reason why this 
dynamic should not operate in other institutional setting. For example, the literature on why Europe 
innovated rapidly during the last half-millennium, while Asia stagnated, often posits this stronger 
evolutionary version of the decentralization hypothesis.25 It is therefore not a major leap to suggest 
that subnational units fostering innovation within a national system might also obey an evolutionary 
dynamic, and therefore be strongly affected by political decentralization. A somewhat weaker 
version of the decentralization hypothesis is exemplified by Drezner who argues that 
decentralization is necessary, but not sufficient, for innovation.26 While Drezner sees government 
decentralization as being generally helpful, he also invokes conditional variables such as factor 
endowments, level of development, size, and just plain luck, in order to explain outlier cases. Yet, 
perhaps the weakest version of the decentralization argument is made by Mokyr, who states that 
decentralization is neither necessary nor sufficient for innovation. He notes that when political 
decentralization manifests itself as severe fragmentation and Balkanization, it can lead to a 
complete lack of cooperation, violent competition, and physical conflict.27 Thus government 
decentralization should hurt innovation as it approaches the extremes of breaking apart a nation or 
causing civil war.  
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In sum, however, despite all the conditions put forward by different theorists, and regardless 
of the specific mechanism emphasized, the core of the decentralization argument remains. Or as 
Mokyr puts it, after a thorough discussion of caveats and provisos: 
 
All the same, some measure of decentralization is probably desirable...it seems  
that too much coordination can be unhealthy. The need to retain some political  
diversity, coupled with openness and freedom of both ideas and the people in which  
they are embedded, seems to be undiminished even as knowledge itself has become  
more mobile...28
 
2.3 Scant Empirical Evidence 
The causal mechanisms outlined above dovetail with some widely held stereotypes about 
national differences in innovation rates. However, little empirical data has yet been produced to 
verify the assumption that decentralized states have some sort of comparative institutional 
advantage that promotes technological innovation. And the empirical data which does exist is either 
limited to anecdotal evidence and stylized facts, or does not directly bear on the question of 
innovation rates. Therefore it is unclear whether any government structure-innovation relationship 
exists in the first place, either in the aggregate or over the long-run. 
In fact, few scholars have attempted to build an empirical case for the decentralization-
innovation hypothesis. In separate research programs, Colleen Dunlavvy, Peter Hall, and T.J. 
Pempel have each tied state structure with technological progress in different case studies.29 
However their linkages are sometimes implicit or indirect, and none of them directly credit 
decentralization with any specific innovative advantages. Historian William McNeill has attributed 
China’s failed brush with industrialization in the fourteenth century to its centralized governmental 
command structure.30 McNeill describes how pockets of market activity developed within the 
ancient Chinese economy, leading first to rapid technological change and later to entrepreneurial-
based challenges to Imperial political authority. In response, the Chinese political establishment 
increasingly used its unified command structure to put down these threats, and redirect China’s 
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resources away from technological innovation. Although McNeill’s brief sketch sounds supportive 
of the decentralization thesis discussed above, the historical research on this period in Chinese 
history is too sparse to eliminate competing hypotheses, nor does a single case prove a theory.  
Perhaps the only direct empirical test of a structure-innovation relationship is that performed 
by Drezner, who investigates two bilateral rivalries for technological leadership (UK vs. Germany, 
Japan vs. US) in separate time periods. Drezner points out that, in both cases, the state with the 
more centralized government structure fell behind the technological leader, even despite initial 
success.31 However, Drezner’s number of observations is too small to produce generalizeable 
conclusions. Nor does he explain why decentralized states such as Australia, Austria, or India have 
not enjoyed similar technological success to the US or Germany, while many centralized states (e.g. 
France, Sweden, Israel, and Finland) innovate at or near the technological frontier.     
 
3. Statistical Tests 
The purpose of the remainder of this article is to ask a fundamental empirical question: is 
there any evidence to support a general relationship between government structure and 
technological innovation? Note that I am not testing here for the presence of a specific causal 
mechanism. This is because decentralization scholars collectively, and sometimes individually, 
describe multiple causal mechanisms by which decentralized government should affect innovation. 
And different researchers posit different combinations of mechanisms. Therefore I will test only for 
the presence of a general correlation. In so doing, my approach is similar to that used by researchers 
who have sought to test for general correlations between smoking and cancer, or industrialization 
and climate change, but did not know the precise causal mechanism involved.32 That is, no matter 
which mechanism is in operation (i.e. increased competition, superior information, greater 
experimentation, limitations on status-quo interests), or even if the specific mechanism(s) remains 
unidentified, the regression models employed below should reveal a correlation between 
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decentralization and innovation if a causal relationship actually exists. Hence my regressions 
constitute a Van Everan “hoop” test: flunking the test provides strong evidence against the 
hypothesized relationship, though passing test may only produce little support for it.33 This 
empirical section of this paper will suggest that the political decentralization hypothesis flunks such 
a “hoop” test. 
3.1. Simple Bivariate Tests 
One fairly straightforward and traditional way to test for the strongest version of a 
decentralization-innovation relationship is to simply compare national patent rates. The results of 
such a test are presented below in Figure 1. Here, using seventeen years of international patent data 
from the European Patent Office (EPO), the combined per capita patenting activity of the five of the 
most decentralized industrialized democracies (Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the 
United States) has been plotted alongside that of the five of the most centralized industrialized 
democracies (Finland, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Sweden). I do not use any formal 
measure of decentralization in these comparisons, but have instead selected those political systems 
which are widely characterized throughout the literature as being either highly decentralized or 
highly centralized. Between 1978-88, the graph reveals no clear innovative advantages to either 
type of government structure; but from 1989-95 the decentralized states do indeed patent more than 
the centralized states. However, the gap between the two groups is always less than 10 percent and 
shows a pattern of reversing itself repeatedly over time, hence there is no way to tell if this apparent 
patenting superiority of decentralized states is a significant long-run phenomena. Given the 
prevalence of the “accepted wisdom” about the benefits decentralization for innovation, one would 
not expect such mild and transitory results. 
[*** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***] 
Ideally, one would want to perform a natural experiment, in which observed changes in 
government structure can be followed by observations of changes in innovative activity, with all 
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other factors held constant. While no empirical situation fits this ideal, we do have a number of 
cases in which governments have decentralized over time, and where we can also collect some 
quantitative data on innovative outputs. These are reported in Figure 2 (below). This graph plots 
changes in decentralization versus changes in innovation in the twenty-nine countries which 
underwent the largest changes in government decentralization from 1975-95. In addition, I also 
plotted the results for the twenty-five countries with the largest changes in relative innovation 
rates.34  
As my measure of overall decentralization in this graph, I employ the POLCON Index 
developed by Witold Henisz (U. Penn).35 The POLCON Index is a 0-1 measure which takes into 
account the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy, modified 
by the extent of party alignment across branches of government and the extent of preference 
heterogeneity within each legislative branch. The inclusion of party alignment and legislative 
preferences means that POLCON is not a pure measure of structural decentralization. However, 
unlike measures which rely purely on formal institutional structure, the POLCON measure allows 
me to control for states which may be formally decentralized but which may suffer ineffective de 
facto checks and balances. It also provides a finer gauge than the traditional technique of using 
“dummies”. Moreover, the POLCON index has been shown to be statistically and positively 
significant in affecting both business investment decisions and technological diffusion in various 
countries, therefore it is natural to ask whether it holds similar significance for innovation rates.36  
 For my measure of innovation in Figure 2, I look at changes in relative innovation rates. 
Specifically, my measure is a country’s change in patent citations received (per capita) as a share of 
the world average, based on international patent data from the United States Patent & Trademark 
Office (USPTO).37 This second database of patents adds value in two ways. First, it provides a 
separate and independent set of patent data by which to index innovation.38 Second, forward 
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citations data are available for all USPTO patents granted between 1975-99. Simple patent counts 
only measure how much innovation is being produced, but weighting patents by their forward 
citations allow us to control somewhat for the quality, as well as the quantity, of the innovations 
being patented. The use of citations-weighted patents as a measure of innovation is discussed at 
greater length in the next section. 
If decentralization is as overwhelming an influence on innovation as is assumed in the 
literature, then those states which have decentralized the most should enjoy significant 
improvements in innovation rates. However, as Figure 2 reveals, only Taiwan and South Korea 
appear to have experienced significant increases in both variables. Otherwise, the countries that 
decentralized most (Spain, Ecuador, Portugal, Greece, and Thailand), experienced little change in 
innovation rates; while the countries which had major shifts in innovative performance (Japan, 
Israel, Switzerland, US, Finland) underwent little change in government structure. Of course, 
“decentralization” in many of these countries was more horizontal and informal, and is perhaps 
better described as a move from autocracy or single-party government towards genuine multi-party 
democracy. But this only strengthens the claim being made here: even using the broadest definition 
and least formal measure of decentralization, it is difficult to find a correlation with innovation. 
[*** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***] 
Using the same measure of innovation, Figure 3 selects out those countries with the largest 
increases in relative innovation rates from 1975-95. The first thing that should strike us here is how 
little change in relative innovation rates there is at all. Few of the 74 countries sampled registered 
any significant shift in their relative rankings, and those with less than a 7.5 percent change have 
been left off of the graph altogether. Secondly, even a cursory examination reveals that the 
decentralized states appear to have had little innovative advantage over other states, regardless of 
size or wealth. The decentralized US and Canada both experienced large relative gains in forward 
patent cites per capita; meanwhile the federalist states of Germany and Switzerland suffered 
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significant relative declines. Amongst the biggest gainers are countries like Japan, Taiwan, Israel, 
Singapore and South Korea, all relatively centralized states. One major new innovator, Finland, 
even marginally increased its centralization (as measured by POLCON). But before we credit 
centralization with this achievement, we must also note that three of the most centralized European 
states (France, Great Britain, and Sweden) are amongst the largest decliners in relative innovation 
rates. More interesting is the nation that does not appear in Figure 3, Spain, which significantly 
decentralized by almost any measure one can calculate. Spain’s negative change in relative 
innovative performance (a mere -0.01 percent) is too small to register on this graph, despite the fact 
that its government continuously decentralized, both horizontally and vertically, formally and 
informally, throughout the entire time period sampled. Hence, even if I “cheat” by selecting on the 
dependent variable, I cannot substantiate the strongest version of the decentralization hypothesis. 
[*** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ***] 
 Of course, these simple bivariate tests do not allow us to control for additional control 
variables invoked by weaker versions of the decentralization hypothesis. According to Drezner, 
Mokyr, and others, these conditional variables should include such factors as democracy, overall 
economic resources, base level of technical development, factor endowments, military spending, 
and openness to trade. These control variables will be considered in greater detail in the regressions 
below. 
 
3.2. Multivariate Statistical Tests 
 
3.2.1. Methods & Data 
In order to test weaker versions of the decentralization-innovation hypothesis, I turn in this 
section to multivariate regressions. I conduct cross-sectional statistical analysis of innovation rates 
across some 70 countries during the 1975-95 period.39 Although time-series cross-sectional 
regressions would be ideal here, the presence of rarely changing independent variables over time 
creates multicollinearity issues, especially when used with country fixed effects. Therefore I stick 
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with ordinary least squares (OLS), with Huber-White estimates of the standard errors.  But since 
there are significant changes in some of the independent variables during these two decades, I later 
split the dataset into four consecutive five-year sub-periods and test each separately. And since a lag 
likely occurs between the activity of innovation and the patent application, I lag the independent 
variables 1, 5, and 10 years in separate regressions wherever possible.  
3.2.2. Dependent Variable: Innovation  
In order to triangulate on the dependent variable, I use three independent and distinct 
measures of innovation: citations-weighted patents (per capita), citations-weighted scientific 
publications (per capita), and high-technology exports (per GDP). By far, the most frequently used 
quantitative measure of national innovation rates is patents. Patents are by definition related to 
innovation. Each patent represents an individual “quantum” of invention which has passed the 
scrutiny of trained specialists, and gained the support of investors and researchers who must 
dedicate time, effort, and significant resources to research and legal protection. Given these 
qualities, patents have been used as a basis for the economic analysis of innovative activity for forty 
years, starting with the pioneering work of economists Frederic Scherer and Jacob Schmookler who 
used patent statistics to investigate the demand-side determinants of innovation.40   
Of course, patents do have weaknesses as a quantitative measure of innovation. First, simply 
adding up patents does not take into consideration that most are for minor innovations, while a few 
represent extremely valuable and far-reaching innovations. Also, simple patents counts have been 
found empirically to correlate well with innovation inputs (e.g. R&D spending), but they are too 
noisy to serve as anything but a very rough measure of innovation output.41 I address these issues 
by weighting patents by their forward citations. The idea here is that minor innovations receive few 
if any citations, and revolutionary innovations receive tens or hundreds. Empirical support for this 
interpretation has arisen in various quarters: citation weighted patents have been found to correlate 
 Page 16 10/30/2006 
well with market value of the corporate patent holder, the likelihood of patent renewal and 
litigation, inventor perception of value, and other measures of innovation outputs.42  
A second potential weakness is that it is often unclear what fraction of a nation’s innovation 
is actually patented, or to what degree selection bias exists in any given set of patent data. This 
problem is exacerbated when we consider that different countries may exhibit significant variance 
in their propensity to patent. However, at the national level, citations-weighted patents have also 
been found to correlate highly with other measures which we generally associate with aggregate 
innovation rates, including GDP growth, manufacturing growth, exports of capital goods, R&D 
spending, capital formation, Nobel Prize winners, etc.43 Thus, even though patents do not capture 
all technological innovation, they do appear to capture a representative sample of it when weighted 
by forward citations and used in large aggregates. 
Still, in order to increase confidence in my results, and to accommodate different 
perspectives on the phenomena and measurement of technological innovation, I corroborate the 
regressions of citations-weighted patent data (per capita) with similar regressions of two additional 
measures of innovation: scientific publications weighted by forward citations (per capita), and high-
technology exports as a percentage of GDP. Scholarly scientific publications offer advantages 
similar to those of patents, with each journal article representing a discrete piece of research 
innovation which must pass independent review and which tends to be cited in proportion to its 
innovative impact. More importantly, scholarly publications data are completely independent of 
patents: they are generally produced by a different set of innovators, affected by different 
incentives, and judged according to different institutional standards.44 High-technology exports as a 
share of GDP is a measure that allows me to better get at undocumented innovation, while further 
stressing economically valuable innovative capacity. Of course, some high-technology exports can 
represent purely locational moves by high-technology firms into low-cost labor countries, but 
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researchers have found this not to be the case in the aggregate or over the long-run. That is, in order 
for high-technology exports to constitute a significant share of a nation’s GDP over several decades, 
the exporting country must have a meaningful and rapidly improving degree of technological 
capability.45  
The patent data comes from a subset of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Patents Database and includes data on over 1.7 million utility patents granted by the US Patent & 
Trademark Office (USPTO) to applicants from the United States and 146 other countries during 
1974-95, and the 9.7 million citations made to these patents during the same time period.46 The 
scientific publications data comes from a subset of the Thomson-ISI National Science Indicators 
database and includes data on over 9.4 million articles published in scientific journals by 
researchers in over 170 countries during 1981-95, and the 164.2 million citations made to these 
articles during the 1981-2002 period. The high-technology exports data comes from the United 
Nations Comtrade database and consists of trade data on total exports in those industry classes 
defined by the OECD as “high-technology”. This OECD definition of “high technology industries” 
is based on R&D intensity, and has been used widely by academic researchers and major 
government institutions for almost two decades.47 Its sectors include aircraft, spacecraft, 
pharmaceuticals, office machinery (includes accounting and computing), telecommunications 
equipment (including radio and television), and medical & scientific instruments.48
 
3.2.3. Independent Variable: Government Decentralization 
 In order to test the decentralization-centralization hypothesis, various different measures of 
government structure are used alternately. The first follows the standard convention used by 
comparativists and consists of dummies for federal systems.49 Federalism dummies have been used 
in this manner by researchers to test for links between government structure and macroeconomic 
performance, corruption, inflation, fiscal responsibility, etc.50 The second measure is the index of 
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federalism devised by Arend Lijphart (UCSD) which ranks countries on a five point scale (Lijphrt 
Fed).51 Note that both the dummies and Lijphart ranks are measures of vertical decentralization 
(federalism) and do not take into account horizontal decentralization. This should not pose a 
problem for those theories which attribute much or all of the innovative benefits of decentralization 
to federalism. However, in order to cover all the theoretically possibilities, I also want to test the 
relevance of horizontal decentralization (division of powers) and total combined decentralization. 
Again, Lijphart’s indices are of use here. Specifically, I alternately sum and average Lijphart’s 
measures of executive dominance (inverse), bicameralism, and judicial review to construct two 
different measures of horizontal decentralization. I further combine these newly constructed 
horizontal measures with Lijphart’s federalism measure to construct two measures (summed and 
average) of total decentralization (Sum Lijphrt and Ave Lijphrt).52 I also experiment with the one of 
the constructed horizontal measures (Sum Lijphrt Horiz) separately. As a third independent measure 
of overall decentralization, I employ the POLCON Index discussed above.53
3.2.4. Additional Control Variables 
 In order to test the weaker versions of the decentralization hypothesis, we also need to 
include controls for those variables specified by decentralization theorists as conditioning the 
effects of government decentralization on innovation. For example, almost universally, these 
researchers assume that the size of a country’s economy and its level of development affect 
innovation rates. The idea here is that larger economies will have more resources upon which 
innovators can draw, and that innovators in more advanced economies should be able to draw on 
these resources more effectively. Hence the primary additional control variables I focus on are 
found in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database: GDP (to control for the 
amount of economic resources upon which innovators can draw), and per capita electric power 
consumption (to control for base-level of economic development).54 Also, since most 
decentralization scholars, especially Mokyr, require a certain amount of political freedom for 
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innovative activity, a measure of Democracy (Polity2, from the Polity IV database) is included.55 
Finally, since the United States is a technological outlier by almost any measure, a US-dummy is 
added.  
The regressions are based on log-log specification, except for the political variables 
(decentralization and democracy) and those variables expressed in percentages. The estimates are 
therefore less sensitive to outliers and can be interpreted in terms of elasticities; log-log models are 
also consistent with much of the prior work in this type of research.56 This results in a primary 
regression model along the following lines: 
 
Ln(Innovationt=0 thru 1) = B0 + B1 * (Govt. Decentralizationt=0) + B2 * Ln(Economic Resourcest=0)  
      + B3 * Ln(Level of Econ. Developmentt=0) + B5 * (Democracyt=0)  
      + B6 * (US dummy) 
 
where patenting activity in period t =0 through t=1 is a function of the independent variables at time 
t =0.  The model is identical when publications are used as the measure of innovation. However, 
when high-technology exports per GDP is the dependent variable, the control for economic 
resources (log of GDP) is replaced with a control for total population (log of population). This 
allows me to match the per capita patents and publications regressions as closely as possible. 
 This model will doubtless arouse some criticism for its narrow approach. Economists, 
sociologists, and policy-analysts often take a more encompassing view when performing statistical 
analysis of innovation at the national level, and include a myriad of policy variables, financial 
controls, and education measures alongside the primary independent variables of interest. Given the 
large potential number of causal lines feeding into national innovation rates, this temptation is 
understandable. Why not control for, say, those factors identified by Furman, Porter, & Stern (2002) 
as contributing to national innovative capacity?57 The answer is that this the decentralization 
hypothesis holds that such policies are either endogenous to government structure, or are 
overwhelmed by its causal effects. Although this may sound like an extreme interpretation of the 
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decentralization argument, recall that these mid-level institutions and policies are exactly those 
which NSI scholars have failed to generalize as causal explanations after almost two decades of 
research.  
 Take as an example the recent debate about the promotion of “intelligent design” in the 
United States. A decentralization theorist would argue that, if the US had a centralized government 
structure, then the Bush administration or a Republican controlled congress could have required US 
public schools to teach intelligent design as science, and even deemphasized the teaching of 
evolution. Depending on the extremes to which this policy were taken, private schools might also 
have felt a need to join this movement in order to be “competitive”, or to meet government 
certification requirements. However, since the US is decentralized, the decision over intelligent 
design was left up to the states and the local school boards. Most of these school districts opted to 
omit intelligent design, others chose to place warning stickers on biology textbooks, still others 
actively promoted the teaching of intelligent design as science. The courts then got involved to 
thwart the teaching of intelligent design as science in some states, while voters changed outcomes in 
local elections in others. Thus decentralized government, both horizontal and vertical, has arguably 
played an important role in virtually eliminating intelligent design, and continuing the support for 
teaching evolution, in science classrooms. A very different outcome might have occurred in a 
centralized American democracy. 
Decentralization proponents argue that similar types of policy battles are regularly fought 
over R&D spending, science policy, education budgets, high-technology procurement, teaching & 
testing standards, etc. These fights take place between different interest groups at both the federal 
and local levels, as well as between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Hence, all sorts 
of policies important for innovation are arguably endogenous to government structure, and in very 
much the ways described by decentralization scholars (i.e. policy responds to competition between 
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different branches and levels of government; is made better by superior information available to 
voters and policymakers at the local level; decentralization creates a menu of different policy 
environments for consumers of public goods to choose from, etc). Note that we need not necessarily 
nor disagree with this; rather the purpose of this paper is merely to test the decentralization-
innovation thesis as given. 
Nonetheless, for those who are not fully convinced by the endogeneity argument, in some 
regressions I do experiment with four additional controls. Three of these are variables which are 
specifically cited by innovation and some decentralization scholars as important causal factors for 
innovation, and which are arguably not endogenous to government structure. First, openness to 
trade (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP) is generally considered to provide 
competitive motivation for long-run innovation.58 Second, military spending is too considered by 
many to be a major source of technological progress, and is included in the regressions as a 
percentage of gross national product.59 Third, natural resources are considered an obstacle to 
innovation, “cursing” otherwise innovative countries into a cycle of dependence on exports of oil, 
metals, raw materials, and agricultural products.60 I therefore experiment with three alternate 
measures of natural resource base (as a percent of total, alternately: arable land, fuel exports, or 
metal/ore exports) in my regressions.61 Finally, although the importance of aggregate education is 
overstated according to some proponents of the decentralization hypothesis,62 and arguably 
endogenous to government structure, I experiment with its inclusion in the regressions. I alternately 
included controls for undergraduates in science and engineering (total and per capita), literacy (as 
percent of population), and government expenditure on education (as percent of total and percent of 
GNP).63
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3.2.5 Primary Regression Results 
The first and most important finding of the regressions is that government decentralization is 
consistently insignificant. With but a single exception, no regression yielded a significant 
coefficient for any measure of decentralization used in any combination with any of the innovation 
measures or conditional variables. This result occurred regardless of the time period tested, the 
measure of decentralization used, the conditional variables included, and whether patents, 
publications, or high-technology exports were employed as the regressand.  Representative results 
of the main set of regressions are tabulated in Tables 1-2.   
[*** TABLES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE ***] 
The lone case in which the null hypothesis can be rejected occurs when I sub-divide 
countries by wealth, but here the affect is fairly small (Table 3). In this case, regression analysis 
suggests that decentralization may foster innovation, but only for one measure of decentralization, 
and only when the dataset is constrained to a small subset of wealthy countries. Here a 0.1 increase 
in the POLCON scale is associated with a 33.6 percent increase in patent citations, 12.8 percent rise 
in publication citations (for OECD members), and a 0.003 percentage point rise in high-technology 
exports per GDP (for high GDP-per-capita countries). Note however that the mean POLCON score 
for either sub-group of wealthy countries is around 0.7, with a maximum of 0.88 and a standard 
deviation of ~0.25. Hence the effect of POLCON on innovation, while statistically significant, is not 
very large. And interestingly, neither centralization nor decentralization appeared to affect the pace 
of technological change in non-wealthy countries, by any measure. These results are discussed 
further below. 
The coefficients of the other independent variables should be interpreted with caution. Since 
the regressions presented here were designed specifically to test the relationship between 
decentralization and innovation, firm conclusions cannot be drawn from them about the other 
independent variables. I therefore prefer to treat them as hypotheses in need of further direct testing.  
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One of these tentative findings is that trade matters. Trade as a percentage of GDP is 
significant and positive in most regressions that include it as an independent variable, and across 
each measure of innovation. The coefficients suggest that, cross-nationally, a 10 percent increase in 
trade as a percentage of GDP is associated with a 10-20 percent increase in citations-weighted 
patents per capita, a 7-8 percent increase in citations-weighted publications per capita, and a 0.005-
0.01 percentage point increase in high-technology exports as a percent of GDP. The relatively larger 
effect of trade on patenting could reflect a greater concern for intellectual property protection by 
trading nations. Also the seemingly small effect of trade openness on high-tech exports is not quite 
so minor when we realize that the sample mean for high-tech exports per GDP is only 0.023 percent 
(with a standard deviation = 0.056 percent). Overall, this finding that trade-openness fosters 
innovation dovetails with much of the trade-innovation literature, and I view it as an additional 
piece of confirmatory evidence to that debate.64
A second tentative finding is that level of development matters for innovation. The per 
capita development measure carried high levels of significance and large coefficients in every 
patents or publications regression which included it as an independent variable. In simple bivariate 
regressions with either patents or publications as the dependent variable, logged KwH per capita 
accounted for over 72 percent of the variance (though this dropped to 10 percent when high-
technology exports was used as the measure of innovation). This makes level of development a 
likely suspect as a primary source of the high R2’s in the multiple regressions of patents and 
publications.65 Of course, high multicollinearity amongst the regressors might also be to blame. In 
order to test this, the variance inflation factors (VIF’s) were calculated and the highest individual 
VIF is reported for each regression with an R2 of 0.75 or above.66 The low VIF’s suggest that high 
multicollinearity is not a problem. Substitution of GDP per capita as the development measure 
yielded no significant differences in the results reported. Nor do these coefficients change 
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significantly across different regression models. Where high-technology exports are concerned, 
level of development does not seem to be significant. This could reflect both the rise of less 
developed innovators such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Ireland, as well as the out-sourcing of high-
technology manufacturing by Western firms to Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Hence you do appear to need to be developed in order to patent and publish, but not 
necessarily to make your economy a hub for high-technology exports.  
Likewise GDP carried high levels of significance in many of the regressions which included 
it as an independent variable. However, these coefficients were at best only half as large as those for 
economic development. This implies that a percentage change in the size of the economy has only 
half the effect on innovation of a percentage change in economic development.  
 There are a few other results worth noting. Interestingly, democracy is significant only for a 
minority of the regressions, a subset of those involving patents or publications. And the coefficients 
for democracy are very small, implying a mere 3-13 percent increase in patents or publications for a 
full 1-point increase on the Polity IV scale. Second, the effect of military spending on both patents 
and scientific publications stands out across many of the regressions. The coefficients suggest that a 
10 percent increase in military spending is associated with 70-80 percent increase in citations-
weighted patents and a 50-70 percent increase in citations-weighted publications. Whether this 
reflects direct military research or a more nuanced correlation between security and innovation is 
unclear.  
Also, the experiments with different measures of natural resource base produced mixed 
results. Arable land as a percentage of total occasionally had an unexpected positive association 
with innovation, but either fuel exports or metals exports (as a percentage of total exports) 
occasionally had a negative association with innovation. While this finding may become the subject 
of future research, it does not cause problems here; no measure of natural resource base affected the 
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significance of government structure, nor did omitting the measure altogether have any substantive 
affect on the regression results. Likewise, experiments with controls for science & engineering 
undergraduates, literacy, and education spending also failed to substantively affect the coefficients 
or significance levels for decentralization. These regressions suggested that, even when we control 
for education, government structure has little overall effect on national innovation rates. 
Finally, various lagged measures of the dependent variable (citations-weighted patents 
citations, simple & per capita) were experimented with in each of the regressions, but with little 
change in the results except to drive up the variance inflation factors to more worrisome levels. And 
since a high correlation (r = 0.87) exists between lagged innovation and electric power 
consumption, it was felt that the latter measure sufficiently captured the control one would seek in 
the former. This also allows me to avoid many of the methodological and interpretational problems 
surrounding lagged dependent variables.67
 
3.2.6 Secondary Regression Results 
One possible explanation for the null results reported for government structure is that 
decentralization may take time to have its effect on technological innovation. After all, in order for 
government structure to affect the conditions and incentives for innovation, it must first alter the 
political, economic, and policy environments within which innovators operate. This might take 
several election or business cycles to be realized in full. In order to test this possibility, I used the 
1974 values for my independent variables and regressed the later five-year sub-periods of 
innovation on them (1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-85). These regression results closely 
resemble those for the entire time period, though interestingly with generally larger coefficients for 
GDP and (for patents) smaller coefficients for level of development. Hence economic size seems to 
affect innovation more strongly over longer time-periods, development less so. Also, military 
spending in these regressions appears significant for both patenting and publishing across all models 
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tested, while arable land appears significant in many models. But each of these findings is 
peripheral to my main concern with decentralization. The fact remains that, even after a decade or 
two, government structure is still insignificant for innovation rates regardless of the model tested. 
This dovetails with what we saw in Figures 2 & 3 above: countries which increased their 
decentralization during the 1975-95 period did not appear to improve their innovative performance. 
Admittedly, this test only covers a 15-20 year time lag, therefore I must remain agnostic as to the 
effects of decentralization over longer periods of time. 
A second alternate explanation for the results reported above is that government 
decentralization might have a bell-shaped relationship with innovation. That is, there may be 
diminishing returns to decentralization such that highly decentralized or highly centralized 
governments may hinder innovation, but that a happy medium exists. I therefore conducted tests 
using a “bell” constructed on the POLCON index, but they too failed to produce significant results. 
A third possible explanation for the null results above is that decentralization might benefit 
innovation in the advanced economies, while centralization might help lesser developed countries in 
Gerschenkronian fashion.68 That is, with their luxury of having the advanced economies as models, 
backward economies may benefit more from a powerful central authority that can force actors down 
a well-trodden economic path towards technological development. Conversely, this kind of 
centralized power might be a handicap for the advanced economies, which by nature of their 
position at the economic frontier must find their way forward more by experiment than by 
government direction. I experiment with two tests for this hypothesis, and the results merit further 
study. First I split the data into OECD and non-OECD subgroups and re-ran the regressions above. 
Second I repeated this exercise, instead splitting the data into “wealthy” and “non-wealthy” 
subgroups, where “wealthy” is defined as being in the top 10 percent of GDP per capita.69 In both 
instances, the POLCON measure showed small but positive and significant coefficients, but not any 
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of the other decentralization measures. It is possible that this result is due to selection bias based on 
the small and overlapping samples. Alternately, it may suggest that not only does decentralization 
matter for wealthy countries, but that informal decentralization (which only the POLCON measure 
captures) may be more important than structural decentralization. In other words, structural 
decentralization does not matter if all actors in the structure belong to the same political party and 
have similar political-economic preferences. (extent of party alignment across branches of 
government and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch). 
[*** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ***] 
 
3.2.7 Potential Problems 
The regressions reported here do have drawbacks which somewhat restrict, but by no means 
eliminate, their usefulness as tests of the government structure-innovation relationship. First, a need 
to conserve degrees of freedom prevents me from adding country and year fixed effects. The 
concern over country fixed affects is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that other researchers have 
used pure fixed-effects models in regressions on patent data, and produced results which show no 
significant innovative differences between decentralized and centralized states.70 Likewise, the 
separation of the dataset into temporal subperiods should mitigate some of the concerns over year 
fixed effects. 
 It is tempting to imagine that endogeneity may be at play. However there currently exists 
neither theoretical justification nor empirical evidence to suspect that an uncontrolled variable 
affects both government structure and innovation. Nor is there reason to suspect that somehow 
technological change affects government structure. History shows us both democratic and 
totalitarian states that have taken advantage of technological change to strengthen the power of 
central government, as well states which have used it to devolve power out to the subnational level. 
Also, these regressions may resemble data-mining or seem cavalier. They are not. The 
inclusion of the different control variables above (trade, military spending, etc) both have solid 
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theoretical basis and were prompted by the specific recommendations of innovation scholars. 
However, so much the better if the regressions had been data-mining or cavalier. Data-mining is 
indeed problematic when it finds correlations that are then used to prove a theory; but if one goes to 
the extreme of data-mining and still cannot find a correlation between two variables, then the 
likelihood that a relationship exists between them becomes highly suspect, which is what I argue 
here. Likewise, if I had found a statistically significant relationship between decentralization and 
innovation, then questions about whether the regressions were overly casual and cavalier would 
have been an issue. But here it would only further support the argument against decentralization 
hypothesis. Indeed, it seems that no matter how cavalier one gets with the data, one still cannot find 
a relationship between decentralized government and innovation. The non-correlation is quite 
robust. 
Another possibility is there may be changing returns to decentralization over time. The 
Spanish case and the subdivision into of time periods would seem to rule out this possibility. 
However, to be fair, one could theorize a situation whereby decentralization might result in few 
gains in innovation as the country initially moves to a new political-economic equilibrium, followed 
by a rapid increase in innovation as the new structural incentives take hold, and then diminishing 
returns after the new equilibrium solidifies. In other words, although the assumption of a simple 
linear relationship between government structure and innovation can now be seriously called into 
question, this does not eliminate the possibility of a more complex model, or the need to consider 
far longer time periods than are analyzed above. 
While these issues reveal the limitations of statistical analysis in testing the government 
structure-innovation relationship, they do not invalidate the results reported here. Certainly, the 
results produced above are robust enough to allow us to question the innovative advantages of 
government decentralization, especially the stronger versions of the decentralization hypothesis. 
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They also point to the importance of case studies as the next step in research on this question. Case 
studies are important for confirming the statistical results produced here. They can resolve, at close 
range, whether there are truly no significant lines of causality between government structure and 
innovation, or whether wealth and government structure might interact to affect the policy 
environment for innovators; whether broad structural forces exist but are obscured or overwhelmed 
by other factors, or are conditional on some omitted variable. Case studies would also allow us to go 
beyond patent data, and judge with greater scrutiny the pace and degree of innovation being 
performed.  
 
4. Conclusions and Implications 
 In sum, I have examined two separate sets of patent evidence, along with data on scientific 
publications and high-technology exports, and found that decentralized states are generally no more 
technologically innovative than centralized states. These findings were robust to the inclusion of 
several conditional variables, including controls for democracy, development, size, natural 
resources, military spending, trade openness, and even education. The only exception to this finding 
was a minor effect, which appeared only amongst a small subset of wealthy countries and only 
when using the broadest measure of decentralization.  
The conventional wisdom is therefore incorrect. Political decentralization may have other 
benefits, but it appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or predicting national 
innovation rates. Certainly no single statistical test or dataset is by itself conclusive, but the 
compounding of the several alternate measures and methods used above establishes a firm basis for 
questioning the assumption that government decentralization leads to higher innovation rates. And 
if we believe that what matters most for long-run aggregate technological change is a competitive 
environment, then the implication of these findings for policymaking is that government 
decentralization is but one way to achieve this, if at all. 
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Perhaps more provocative were the secondary findings, such as the relatively minor 
influence of democracy, and relatively large effect of lagged military spending, on innovation over 
time. These results deserve some attention in future research since they contradict much of the 
endogenous-growth literature which puts a heavy emphasis on civilian democratic institutions for 
explaining long-run innovation-driven economic growth and efficiency. It suggests that, rather than 
being a natural product of institutional reform, innovation could instead be a rational solution to a 
perceived security problem. In other words, long-run technological innovation may find better 
explanations in international relations theory rather than comparative political institutions. This is 
an aspect almost totally ignored by the economists and sociologists who study innovation, and 
deserves greater attention from political scientists. Of course it is important not to get ahead of 
ourselves here, since the various tests reported here were not specifically designed to examine 
causal relationships between democracy and innovation. A useful next step in testing, therefore, 
would be for researchers to conduct in-depth qualitative analysis of individual technological case 
studies in order to confirm and refine each of the findings above. 

Figure 1: Innovation in Advanced Democracies: Decentralized vs. Centralized States 
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Figure 2: Innovation vs. Decentralization in 45 Countries (1975-95) 
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Figure 3: Change in Patent Cites Received Per Capita as Percent of World Ave. (1970-75 vs. 1990-95) 
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Note:  n=74, countries not shown had a change of <7.5%. Source: United States Patent & Trademark Office, NBER (2001). Countries shown: 
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Kong, Bahamas, Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland, South Korea, Canada, Singapore, Finland, United States, Israel, Taiwan, Japan. 
 
                  Page 10/30/2006 35
Table 1: Primary Regressions of Technological Innovation (1975-95)  
                            DV = Log of Patent Citations Received Per Capita    DV = Log of Pub Citations Received Per Capita    DV = High-Tech Exports as % of GDP
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Sum Lijphrt -0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.07] [0.06] [0.001]
Ave Lijphrt -0.03 0.03 0.00
[0.27] [0.22] [0.004]
Lijphrt Fed 0.06 0.09 -0.003
[0.15] [0.13] [0.004]
Sum Lijphrt -0.06 -0.07 0.002
Horizntl [0.12] [0.09] [0.004]
Federalism -0.36 -0.25 0.004
Dummies [0.34] [0.26] [0.01]
POLCON 1.13 0.38 -0.02
[1.07] [0.64] [0.05]
Log GDP 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.32 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.16
[0.15]** [0.15]** [0.16]** [0.11]** [0.11]** [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.08]* [0.08]*
Log Popultn -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
Log KwH/cap 1.59 1.59 1.55 1.33 1.26 1.30 1.30 1.25 1.09 1.07 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006
[0.31]*** [0.31]*** [0.36]*** [0.17]*** [0.19]*** [0.22]*** [0.22]*** [0.21]*** [0.09]*** [0.11]*** [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007]
Democracy 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.001
[0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]* [0.02] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
US Dummy -0.13 -0.13 0.03 0.98 0.71 -0.54 -0.54 -0.33 -0.01 -0.17 -0.009 -0.009 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
[0.59] [0.59] [0.68] [0.44]* [0.42] [0.45] [0.45] [0.52] [0.32] [0.3] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
constant -31.1 -31.1 -30.7 -25.9 -25.0 -16.6 -16.6 -16.2 -16.0 -15.5 0.002 0.002 -0.01 0.04 0.03
[2.51]*** [2.51]*** [2.74]*** [2.36]*** [2.34]*** [2.23]*** [2.23]*** [2.45]*** [1.76]*** [1.83]*** [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04]
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.04
max VIF 1.93 1.93 2.5 2.2 4.15 1.93 1.93 2.50 2.17 4.02
# obs 28 28 28 70 69 28 28 28 74 73 28 28 28 78 76  
Note: Analysis is by ordinary least squares (OLS), Huber-White estimates of standard errors reported in brackets. All independent variables are 1974 
values, all dependent variables are overall value of the 1975-95 period. *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p<.001 
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Table 2: Secondary Regressions of Technological Innovation (1975-95)  
                            DV = Log of Patent Citations Received Per Capita    DV = Log of Pub Citations Received Per Capita                 DV = High-Tech Exports as % of GDP
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Sum Lijphrt -0.03 0.02 -0.0001
[0.06] [0.05] [0.001]
Ave Lijphrt -0.13 0.08 -0.003
[0.24] [0.19] [0.003]
Lijphrt Fed 0.03 0.06 -0.003
[0.12] [0.1] [0.004]
Sum Lijphrt -0.09 -0.02 0.001
Horizntl [0.13] [0.08] [0.003]
Federalism -0.25 -0.08 0.007
Dummies [0.35] [0.25] [0.01]
POLCON 1.32 0.93 -0.02
[0.99] [0.65] [0.03]
Log GDP 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.38 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.2 0.18
[0.20]** [0.20]** [0.23]** [0.12]** [0.12]** [0.12] [0.12] [0.13] [0.08]* [0.08]*
Log Popultn 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.02 0.02
[0.002]* [0.002]* [0.003] [0.004]*** [0.004]***
Log KwH/cap 1.27 1.27 1.21 1.22 1.14 1.38 1.38 1.34 1.01 0.94 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.0003 0.002
[0.33]** [0.33]** [0.40]** [0.16]*** [0.18]*** [0.23]*** [0.23]*** [0.26]*** [0.1]*** [0.11]*** [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Democracy 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009
[0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]** [0.02] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006]
US Dummy 0.33 0.33 0.52 1.28 1.07 -0.44 -0.44 -0.32 0.01 -0.09 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.0009 0.007
[0.52] [0.52] [0.64] [0.49]* [0.47]* [0.52] [0.52] [0.55] [0.34] [0.31] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
Miltry Spnding 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.003 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.001
[0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.05] [0.05] [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.025]* [0.02]* [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0006]
Trade per GDP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.001 0.001
[0.01]* [0.01]* [0.01]* [0.003]** [0.003]*** [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.0002]* [0.0002]* [0.0002]* [0.0003]*** [0.0002]***
Arable Land -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.00 -0.0001
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01] [0.01] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
_cons -35.8 -35.8 -35.6 -27.5 -26.7 -17.3 -17.3 -17.2 -16.8 -16.4 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.30 -0.31
[3.33]*** [3.33]*** [3.47]*** [2.78]*** [2.73]*** [2.06]*** [2.06]*** [2.09]*** [1.84]*** [1.91]*** [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.08]*** [0.07]***
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.86 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.70 0.71
max VIF 4.01 4.01 4.23 2.89 4.91 4.01 4.01 4.23 2.84 4.76
# obs 28 28 28 68 67 28 28 28 72 71 28 28 28 70 69  
Note: Analysis is by ordinary least squares (OLS), Huber-White estimates of standard errors reported in brackets. All independent variables are 1974 
values, all dependent variables are overall value of the 1975-95 period. *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p<.001 
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Table 3: Regressions of Technological Innovation in Rich Nations (1975-95) 
Dependent Variable:
Pat Cites Pub Cites HT Exprts Pat Cites Pub Cites HT Exprts
OECD Member X X X
Wealthy Country X X X
POLCON 3.36 1.28 0.05 3.36 0.95 0.03
[0.76]*** [0.55]* [0.028]† [0.52]*** [1.04] [0.009]*
Log GDP 0.46 0.23 0.58 0.45
[0.11]** [0.17] [0.12]** [0.34]
Log Popultn -0.003 0.0003
[0.006] [0.002]
Log KwH/cap 1.14 0.75 -0.01 2.11 0.35 0.016
[0.41]* [0.29]* [0.01] [0.53]** [0.95] [0.007]*
Democracy‡
US Dummy -0.23 -0.42 0.0004 -1.52 -0.73 -0.02
[0.47] [0.50] [0.017] [0.64]* [1.41] [0.009]*
Constant -29.9 -15 0.14 -40.6 -17.3 -0.14
[4.99]*** [4.59]*** [0.17] [6.51]*** [11.4] [0.06]
R-squared 0.89 0.62 0.19 0.94 0.5 0.66
max VIF 1.96 1.86
# obs 24 24 23 12 12 11  
Note: Analysis is by ordinary least squares (OLS), Huber-White estimates of standard  
errors reported in brackets. All independent variables are 1974 values, all dependent  
variables are overall value of the 1990-95 period. † p<.10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p<.001, 
‡ omitted due to high multicollinearity.
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